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THREE DISPUTES AND THREE OBJECTIVES
China and the South China Sea
Peter Dutton
The recent heightening of the competition between China and its neighborsover sovereignty, resources, and security in the South China Sea has drawn
the attention of diplomatic and military leaders from many countries that seek
to promote stability and security in these globally important waters. For states
that ring the South China Sea, its waters represent a zone of rich hydrocarbon
and protein resources that are increasingly dear on land as populations exhaust
their territories’ ability to meet their increasing needs. This resource competi-
tion alone could be the basis of sharp-edged disputes between the claimants.
However, the South China Sea also represents the projection of the cultural con-
sciousness of the centuries-long relationship that each coastal nation has had
with its adjoining seas. This fact fuels competing modern-day nationalist ten-
dencies among claimant-state populations, tendencies that in turn magnify the
importance of the disputes and, during times of crisis, narrow the options for
quiet negotiation or de-escalation.
As American leaders discuss policies and strategies in support of regional sta-
bility, some have described the complex disputes in the South China Sea as es-
sentially a tangled knot of intractable challenges. Actually, however, there are
three severable categories of disputes, each with its own parties, rule sets, and
politics. There are disputes over territorial sover-
eignty, in the overlapping claims to the South China
Sea’s islands, rocks, and reefs; disputes over which
coastal states claim rightful jurisdiction over waters
and seabed; and disputes over the proper balance of
coastal-state and international rights to use the seas
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for military purposes. Unfortunately, the region’s states are currently pursuing
win-lose solutions to all three of these disputes. A careful analysis of the nature
of each dispute reveals, instead, opportunities for more productive pathways to
resolution achieved through win-win problem solving and recognition of the
mutuality and commonality of interests in these globally important waters.
THREE DISPUTES
The disputes in these three categories have resulted in recurring flashes of ten-
sion and conflict for approximately forty years. Notable incidents over sover-
eignty include the Chinese attack on the forces of the Republic of Vietnam in the
Paracel Islands in 1974, China’s attack on Vietnamese forces near Fiery Cross
Reef in 1988, and China’s military ouster of Philippines forces from Mischief
Reef in 1995. The overall result of this series of incidents was the coalescence of a
unified Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) political position in op-
position to China’s behavior. A politically unified ASEAN persuaded China to ac-
cept the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea to decrease tensions among neighbors. The declaration includes an agreement
by all parties to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force.”1 The Declaration of Con-
duct became the centerpiece of more than a decade of relative regional calm after
1995, the product of a Chinese shift in policy to pursue improved regional integra-
tion with its Southeast Asian neighbors through generous economic, commercial,
infrastructural, and cultural programs. The United States repeatedly professed
neutrality as to the outcome of the sovereignty and jurisdictional disagreements,
as long as all parties continued to pursue peaceful means of resolution.
This stability was shattered by a series of antagonistic Chinese actions that be-
gan in 2007. A flare-up in tensions in the South China Sea began when China
pressured Vietnam and several oil companies in connection with oil exploration
and drilling off the Vietnamese coasts. As the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Scot Marciel, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
July 2009, “Starting in the summer of 2007, China told a number of U.S. and for-
eign oil and gas firms to stop exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the
South China Sea or face unspecified consequences in their business dealings
with China.”2 The Senate hearing was being held in the wake of the March 2009
Impeccable incident, which had awakened many in the United States to China’s
more assertive stance in the South China Sea. In that incident, an American na-
val research vessel was aggressively harassed approximately seventy nautical
miles off Hainan Island by Chinese “fishermen” with the support of Chinese ci-
vilian law-enforcement vessels and under the observation of a People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy intelligence ship.3
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These Chinese actions resulted in a return of tension to the region. In re-
sponse to China’s new strategy, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated at the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2010, “The United States, like every na-
tion, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s mari-
time commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. . . . The
United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for re-
solving the various territorial disputes without coercion. . . . We encourage the
parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct.”4
Until this time, the only attribute common to all South China Sea disputes
had been that they involved China as a party. However, China’s turn in 2009 to-
ward an assertive, even aggressive approach—especially in its efforts to control
U.S. naval activities in the South China Sea—resulted in new American atten-
tion to and interest in all three categories of disputes. In order to find a pathway
to return to the desired state of regional stability, it is helpful to examine the at-
tributes of each of the three types.
Sovereignty
Disputes over sovereignty center on questions of which coastal states have the
right to exercise the full measure of state authority over the physical territory of
the islands in the South China Sea. They involve Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and perhaps Brunei, as well as China and Taiwan.5 Vietnam claims “indis-
putable sovereignty” over all of the Spratly (Truong Sa) and Paracel (Hoang Sa)
Islands;6 one possible interpretation of some of its recent submissions to the
United Nations (UN), however, is that it might be willing to relinquish its claims,
at least as regards the Spratlys, in return for recognition of wider resource rights in
the South China Sea.7 Malaysia claims sovereignty over approximately twelve of
the southernmost Spratly Islands, based on their situation on its claimed conti-
nental shelf. Likewise, Brunei appears to makes a similar claim to sovereignty over
Louisa Reef, on the basis of its location within its claimed exclusive economic
zone. The Philippines claims sovereignty over many of the easternmost Spratly
Islands, a cluster to which it refers as the Kalayaan Island Group.8
China and Taiwan maintain overlapping, related claims to all the islands in
the South China Sea. In 1947 the Nationalist government of the Republic of
China began to publish maps with a U-shaped series of lines in the South China
Sea delineating its maritime boundaries (see map). These maps were based on a
1935 internal government report prepared to define the limits of China, many
parts of which were dominated by outside powers at the time.9 Though the exact
nature of the claim was never specified by the Nationalist government, the carto-
graphic feature persisted in maps published by the Communist Party after it
came to power on the mainland in 1949, and today the U-shaped line’s nine
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dashes in the South China Sea remain on maps published both in China and on
Taiwan.10 In 1992, further clarifying its claims of sovereignty over all the islands
in the South China Sea, the People’s Republic of China enacted its Law on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which specifies that China claims sover-
eignty over the features of all of the island groups that fall within the U-shaped
line in the South China Sea: the Pratas Islands (Dongsha), the Paracel Islands
(Xisha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and the Spratly Islands (Nansha). The
U-shaped line therefore represents one factor in understanding the competing
claims to the numerous islands, shoals, rocks, and islets contained within its
nine dashes.
The Chinese government appears to maintain a studied policy of ambiguity
about the line’s meaning. Among Chinese scholars and officials, however, there
appear to be four dominant schools of thought—some related to sovereignty and
others more relevant to China’s jurisdictional claims (which will be analyzed
below).
Sovereign Waters. The first approach taken by some Chinese policy analysts is
that the expanse enclosed by the U-shaped line should be considered fully sover-
eign Chinese waters, subject to the complete measure of the government’s au-
thority, presumably as either internal waters or territorial seas. One group of
senior Chinese defense analysts, for instance, describes the nation’s offshore inter-
ests as “the area extending out from the Chinese mainland coastline between 200
nautical miles (to the east) and 1600 nautical miles (to the south),” or roughly to
four degrees north latitude as claimed in the 1935 report. They consider these “sea
domains under Chinese jurisdiction . . . [as] the overlaying area of China’s na-
tional sovereignty.”11 Another researcher refers to “China’s debates with neighbor-
ing countries over China’s maritime sovereignty” in advising that the correct
strategy is for China “to struggle rather than to fight.”12 It has been easy for some
to dismiss this perspective as based on mistranslation or the failure of nonspe-
cialists to appreciate the distinction between sovereignty, sovereign rights, and
jurisdiction. However, experienced Chinese legal specialists have specifically
used the term “sovereignty” in presentations about China’s claims in the South
China Sea delivered to legal practitioners of other nations in international fo-
rums.13 The concept that China exercises full sovereignty over all the waters em-
braced by the U-shaped line is also implicit in the description by at least one
military scholar of the seas surrounding China’s shores as “China’s ‘blue-colored
land’” and as a region “owned” by China.14
Historic Waters. Some Chinese have suggested that the concept of “historic wa-
ters” enables the government legitimately to claim broad control over the South
China Sea.15 The concept, a variation on China’s claim of sovereignty in the
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South China Sea, reflects the view held by many Chinese academics and policy
makers that the nine-dash line represents a claim to historic waters, historic “ti-
tle,” or at least some kind of exclusive rights to administer the waters and terri-
tory within the line’s boundaries.16 Perhaps the most authoritative statement of
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The U-shaped line formed by the nine dashes reflects China’s claim over the waters and islands of the South China Sea. Three types
of legal disputes arise from the claim: sovereignty disputes related to the island features, disputes over resource jurisdiction in the
surrounding waters, and disputes over the extent of coastal-state authority to prohibit foreign military activities. (United Nations,
www.un.org.)
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international law on the point was issued in 1951 by the International Court of
Justice in the Fisheries Case, in which the United Kingdom challenged before the
International Court of Justice a claim by Norway to sovereignty over waters
along its craggy coastline beyond the traditional three-mile territorial-sea limit
of the time.17
The court considered three relevant factors. The first was the close geograph-
ical dependence of the territorial sea upon the land domain—the relevant por-
tions of the Norwegian coastline being deeply indented, with complex
geographic features and an estimated 120,000 minor islands, islets, rocks, and
shoals. The second factor was the presence or absence of links between the land
formations and the sea space sufficiently close to make the region susceptible to
a fully sovereign regime of governance. Finally, it considered unique economic
interests belonging to the coastal state as clearly evidenced by long usage. Ulti-
mately the court approved Norway’s extension, based on its historic claims, of
sovereignty over the sea areas and the features contained within them.
The requirements laid out in the Fisheries Case for an extension by a coastal
state of sovereignty over water space do not lend support to China’s claim. In
particular, there is no close geographical dependence between the sea and the
land in this region. Indeed, the land features are so insignificant that they have
long been seen more as navigational hazards than as productive territory. Addi-
tionally, the islets themselves are more widely dispersed than are the features
along the Norwegian coastline. The merely sporadic presence of fishermen and
traders and the lack of freshwater and arable land to support an indigenous pop-
ulation in any case strongly suggest that the region is not susceptible to a fully
sovereign regime of governance. Accordingly, China’s claim of historic waters
has weak support on these bases.
Concerning the question of unique economic interests, China has had well
documented contact with the islands of the South China Sea for many centuries
through fishermen, traders, and the occasional government official. But the his-
torical record reflects similarly well documented contact by Vietnam. Neither
country has a record of sustained, exclusive use of or reliance upon the resources
of the South China Sea. The peoples of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia
have also maintained contact with these islands, in support of traditional fishing
and local trade. Thus, no evidence points to unique economic interests of China
or any other single country in or around the islands of the South China Sea.
Rather the evidence suggests the contrary—that the waters of the South China
Sea and their sparse islands, islets, rocks, and reefs have for many centuries been
the common fishing grounds and trading routes of all regional peoples. Indeed,
this long-standing common usage suggests that far from having been supervised
as any party’s zone of sovereignty, the South China Sea developed as a sort of
D U T T O N 4 7
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regional common in which all parties pursued their interests without fear of
molestation by the authorities of other coastal states.
Island Claims. Some Chinese academics and policy makers view the U-shaped
line as asserting a claim to sovereignty over all the islands, rocks, sandbars, coral
heads, and other land features that pierce the waters of the South China Sea, as
well as to whatever jurisdiction international law of the sea allows coastal states
based on sovereignty over these small bits of land.18 On its face at least, a Chinese
claim to sovereignty over the islands and to jurisdiction lawfully derived from it
is legitimate, in that it complies with the general provisions of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other aspects of law
of the sea. However, a series of fundamental problems undermine it, including
the fact that Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan all maintain claims
to sovereignty over some or all of the islands in the South China Sea. Since the
1995 Mischief Reef incident between China and the Philippines, a certain stabil-
ity has been achieved since the five claimants that occupy certain features have
agreed to maintain the status quo.
China, of course, occupies and administers all of the Paracels, though Viet-
nam still maintains its claim to sovereignty over them. The Spratlys represent a
mixed case. Since 1996, Vietnam has occupied or controlled approximately
twenty-two features, China roughly ten features, the Philippines eight, Malaysia
four, and Taiwan one.19 In order to support a claim of sovereignty over an island,
international law requires that a coastal state demonstrate effective occupation
or continuous administration and control.20 Accordingly, China’s claim to those
of the Spratly Islands that it does not occupy or effectively administer or control
is unsupported by international law. The same is true of the claims of any other
parties that do not actually occupy features over which they claim sovereignty.
Some observers wrongly conclude that the non-Chinese claims are based solely
on European claims from the colonial era. In fact, those of Southeast Asian states
are at least in part expressions of the contacts all coastal peoples have had with
the South China Sea’s islands and waters for many centuries and of national
consciousness that international law should protect those interests.
Security Interests. Finally, a fourth Chinese perspective is that the U-shaped line
reflects China’s long-standing maritime security interests in the South China
Sea and that these security interests should have legal protection. The Chinese
have long viewed the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the
South China Sea—the “near seas”—as regions of core geostrategic interest and
as parts of a great defensive perimeter established on land and at sea to protect
China’s major population and economic centers along the coasts. As one
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People’s Liberation Army (PLA) major general recently put it, the South China
Sea constitutes part of China’s maritime “strategic stability belt.”21
China’s assertiveness about its claims in the waters of its near seas has grown
in tandem with the size of its navy and maritime services. As one Chinese analyst
put it, “The Navy is just one of the means of protecting our maritime rights and
interests[;] . . . the primary means should be to rely on the law, on international
law and internal legislation.” To enforce these laws and sovereign interests at sea,
“in recent years we have started to carry out periodic patrols to safeguard our
rights in the East and South China Seas.”22 Thus, some Chinese see international
law, in conjunction with their developing maritime power, as a means to estab-
lish the long-desired maritime security buffer throughout the near seas, includ-
ing the South China Sea. That international law does not provide protection for
a coastal state’s security interests beyond the narrow territorial sea has not
deterred Chinese proponents from seeking to change those norms.
Jurisdiction
A second category of disputes involves the delimitation of jurisdictional bound-
aries between neighboring sea zones, including exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) and continental shelves. China complicates these disputes through its
ambiguous claims of authority over the water space within the nine-dash line,
but it is clear that the claim encompasses aspects of jurisdiction as well as aspects
of sovereignty.23 “Jurisdiction” under international law is something less than
full sovereignty, in that it does not include the same degree of absolute and ex-
clusive authority to govern all matters of interest to the state. Like sovereignty,
jurisdiction is a reflection of state power within specified boundaries, but the con-
cept of jurisdiction connotes the application of state authority only over a lim-
ited, specified set of subject matters. All the disputants involved in the question of
sovereignty are also involved in the jurisdictional disputes, plus Indonesia,
which has an EEZ claim extending from Natuna Island that overlaps with
China’s nine-dash line.24
The two main sources of jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea are
the boundaries of the various national EEZs and continental-shelf zones over
which each state may exercise its authority. Within the geographic limits out-
lined in UNCLOS article 76 (specified boundaries), coastal states are afforded
exclusive authority (state power) to regulate the exploration and exploitation of
the resources of the seabed, although the legal character of the water space above
the continental shelf remains unchanged (a limited, specified set of subject mat-
ters). Thus, international law provides for limited coastal-state jurisdiction
within a specified zone known as the continental shelf.
D U T T O N 4 9
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Similarly, one of the key innovations of UNCLOS was that it specified
coastal-state authority in the water space beyond the territorial sea, a concept
that had been steadily developing over the course of the twentieth century.
UNCLOS Part V established coastal-state jurisdiction over a vast littoral swath
of water space known as the EEZ, which may extend to two hundred nautical
miles from the coastal state’s baselines (specified coastal boundaries), and in
which the coastal state has “sovereign rights” to the resources plus related juris-
dictional authorities (exclusive state power over the specified resource-related
matters), for the purpose of managing those resources. Thus, UNCLOS com-
pleted the creation of jurisdictional regimes over resources in littoral waters. Ac-
cordingly, this second category of disputes is at its core a disagreement over
jurisdictional authority in the South China Sea to explore and exploit the
resources on and under the sea’s continental shelf and in its water column.
China’s Ambiguous Jurisdictional Claims. All states with coastlines that border
the South China Sea claim continental shelves and EEZs; however, very little ac-
tual delimitation of the boundaries between coastal-state zones has occurred.25
China’s nine-dash-line claim presents a particular problem for resolving these
disputes, because in addition to relying on the line as a source of sovereignty,
Chinese policy makers also refer to it as the basis for China’s South China Sea ju-
risdictional claims. As noted above, some Chinese scholars and policy makers
assert that the concept of historic rights (as an alternative to, or in addition to,
China’s claim to historic waters in the South China Sea) applies as a basis for ju-
risdictional control over water space within the nine-dash line. The concept of
historic waters has only the briefest mention in UNCLOS, but it exists in cus-
tomary international law related to bays. It allows coastal states to claim ex-
tended jurisdiction over water space or islands when their claims have been
open and long-standing, exclusive, and widely accepted by other states.
China’s claim to a historic right to jurisdiction over the waters of the South
China Sea is seriously undermined by similar, overlapping claims maintained by
the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, not to mention paral-
lel claims made separately by Taiwan. This demonstrates that however long-
standing China’s claims of jurisdiction in the South China Sea may be, clearly they
are not exclusive or widely accepted by other states. Nonetheless, Chinese law as-
serts historic rights as a basis for jurisdiction over the South China Sea. The 1998
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
Continental Shelf claims an exclusive economic zone emanating from all Chi-
nese territory, which would logically mean all relevant Chinese territory as spec-
ified in the 1992 Territorial Sea Law, which in turn, as noted above, specifically
includes each of the island groups in the South China Sea. Thus, in combination,
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these two Chinese laws assert an EEZ and therefore jurisdictional control over
nearly the entire South China Sea area within the U-shaped line.
This impression was reinforced in April 2011 when China submitted a note
verbale to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, formed under
the terms of UNCLOS.26 Ostensibly, China’s note protested a Philippines sub-
mission that had asserted jurisdiction in the waters surrounding the Kalayaan
Islands (i.e., the Philippine-claimed group of Spratly Islands).27 However, these
submissions both join a lengthening portfolio of legal briefs submitted by the
various claimants to clarify and justify their various South China Sea claims.28
China’s note stated, “Under the relevant provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS, as well
as the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone (1992) and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental
Shelf of the PROC (1998), China’s Nansha Islands is [sic] fully entitled to Terri-
torial Sea, EEZ and Continental Shelf.” Given that the domestic laws referred to
in China’s note specifically assert additional “historic rights” that are not relin-
quished by China’s creation of an EEZ or continental shelf, the note verbale does
little to clarify the ambiguity with which China has so carefully cloaked its claims,
since such historic rights continue to leave room to assert legal protection for mar-
itime sovereignty or security interests.
In addition to its ambiguity and lack of specificity, there are many other prob-
lems with China’s approach to jurisdiction in the South China Sea. For instance,
only a very few of the South China Sea’s islands qualify under UNCLOS for more
than the mere twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea. Article 121 requires that is-
lands support human habitation or economic activity before they can accrue a
full two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Smaller is-
lands, referred to as “rocks,” accrue no more than a twelve-mile territorial sea.
Virtually all of the features in the Spratly Islands group clearly fall into the latter
category. Another weakness of China’s claim of jurisdiction over the South
China Sea based on its assertion of sovereignty over the sea’s rocks and sandbars
is that it has objected to similar claims made by Japan to an exclusive economic
zone and continental-shelf rights around Okinotorishima, a small coral feature
in the Pacific Ocean about 1,050 nautical miles south of Tokyo.29 International
law prevents a state from claiming legal rights if it objects to the same type of
claims by other states. Accordingly, neither the provisions of UNCLOS nor his-
toric rights are especially persuasive sources of law on which China can base its
claims.
Jurisdictional Claims by Other States. The jurisdictional claims of Vietnam and
Malaysia conform much more closely than China’s assertions to international
law. Vietnam, for instance, claims an exclusive economic zone that “is adjacent
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to the Vietnamese territorial sea and forms with it a 200-nautical-mile zone
from the baseline used to measure the breadth of Viet Nam’s territorial sea.”30 In
addition to clarity about the boundaries of its claim, Vietnam also specifies the
extent of its national jurisdiction.31 Vietnam’s jurisdictional claims track nearly
word for word with the requirements of UNCLOS articles 57 and 56, respec-
tively, although it should be noted that Vietnam’s baselines are considered by the
U.S. State Department to be excessive.32
Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 make similarly normative EEZ
and continental-shelf claims.33 Additionally, the Joint Submission of Malaysia
and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf makes a
reasonable claim to an extended continental shelf beyond the two-hundred-
nautical-mile EEZ in accordance with UNCLOS article 76.34 The submission
starts with each coastal state’s baselines and measures two hundred nautical
miles without regard to any island features. Concerning the Spratly Islands, the
legal approach taken by Vietnam and Malaysia, in contrast with the various Chi-
nese approaches, complies with UNCLOS article 121 concerning the regime of
islands and with recent case law. Specifically, the Malaysia-Vietnam approach
recognizes that the various islets, reefs, and shoals in the southern part of the
South China Sea are too small to form the basis of a claim to an EEZ or a conti-
nental shelf (or any other form of jurisdiction other than a territorial sea) of
their own right.
Another important aspect of Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s claims is that they are
specific and public. They represent a choice made by each government concern-
ing how international law should be interpreted in regard to its jurisdiction over
offshore zones. They provide a basis for discussion, negotiation, and even poten-
tially litigation by other states that have different perspectives. They do not rely on
power—military or economic—to decide the issue. In these ways, the Malaysia-
Vietnam approach provides a basis for a stable resolution to any disputes, which is
the point of the comment by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries
Case discussed above.
The government of the Philippines established archipelagic baselines for its
main islands in legislation completed in 2009 and filed on deposit with the
UN.35 This legislation also claims a separate, nonspecific regime of islands for its
Kalayaan Islands claims and its separate claim to the Scarborough Shoal. The
Philippines also maintains an EEZ claim based on a 1978 presidential proclama-
tion.36 The Philippines EEZ extends two hundred nautical miles from its baselines,
which were publicly established by the 2009 legislation. Thus, with regard to its
main islands, the Philippines made a specific and public claim concerning the ex-
tent of its EEZ.
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Concerning its continental-shelf claim, the Philippines retains on file with
the UN its Presidential Proclamation of 1968, which claims a continental shelf
“to where the depth of the [Philippines] superjacent waters admits of the exploi-
tation of such resources, including living organisms belonging to sedentary spe-
cies.”37 This outdated expression of the jurisdictional limits of the Philippines
continental-shelf claim stems from the definition that appeared in the 1958
Continental Shelf Convention, the provisions of which were updated by
UNCLOS article 76.38 Additionally, the Philippines made a claim to an extended
continental shelf in the Philippine Sea, but not in the South China Sea. The Phil-
ippines could improve the clarity of its jurisdictional claims to a continental
shelf by bringing its proclamation into alignment with UNCLOS. Additionally,
the government of the Philippines should publicly state what, if any, claims to
jurisdiction over maritime zones it maintains, based on its claim of sovereignty
over some of the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Reef. These steps would pro-
mote stability by removing sources of ambiguity and allowing for negotiations
or arbitration in concert with international law.
In sum, the jurisdictional claims of Malaysia and Vietnam are fully public and
stated with specificity. The claims of the Philippines are improving in clarity, but
there continues to be room for improvement in that regard. The claims of
Brunei should be made more publicly accessible by placing them on deposit
with the UN. The jurisdictional claims of China (and Taiwan) in the South
China Sea, however, remain ambiguous and therefore contribute to regional in-
stability and present problems for all states whose vessels operate in the South
China Sea.
Control
The third category of disputes relates to attempts to assert coastal-state control
over the activities of military vessels operating in the South China Sea and is
fundamentally about the correct interpretation of international law concerning
the balance of coastal-state and international rights and obligations in the EEZ
and other jurisdictional waters. As a practical matter there are only two parties
to the dispute in this category, China and the United States. Many other coun-
tries around the globe, however, have interests and stakes in its outcome, since
this category involves China’s various attempts to alter international norms con-
cerning freedom of navigation for military purposes and to roll back the balance
of coastal-state and international rights in coastal zones that were negotiated in
the development of UNCLOS. This resulted in a series of confrontations be-
tween American and Chinese government vessels in the South China Sea
between 2001 and 2009 that, although tension producing, were manageable from
a political and military perspective.39 China ended this mutual policy of “managed
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friction,” however, on 8 March 2009, when it confronted USNS Impeccable
(T-AGOS 23) with five vessels—a PLA Navy intelligence ship, a government fish-
eries patrol vessel, a maritime surveillance service vessel of the State Oceano-
graphic Administration, and two small fishing trawlers.40
Under the observation of all three Chinese government vessels, the fishing
trawlers maneuvered dangerously to within eight meters ahead of Impeccable
and then abruptly stopped. This forced Impeccable to take emergency action to
avoid a collision. Additionally, the Chinese aboard the fishing trawlers used a
grappling hook to try to snag Impeccable’s towed cable and its related acoustic
equipment.41 These Chinese actions violated international norms related to the
duty to exercise due regard in navigation of vessels at sea and also constituted
unlawful interference with a sovereign vessel of another state. Impeccable left the
scene in order to reduce immediate tensions but returned to the exact location
several days later in the company of an American warship, USS Chung Hoon
(DDG 93).42 Thus, the Chinese escalation from past patterns raised the dispute
over navigation issues from “managed friction” to one of “near conflict,” thereby
initiating renewed American strategic attention to the waters of the South China
Sea and to the international norms governing freedom of navigation for military
purposes in the EEZ.
The creation of the exclusive economic zone in 1982 by UNCLOS as a region
extending beyond the territorial sea to a maximum of two hundred nautical
miles from a coastal state’s shores was a carefully balanced compromise between
the interests of coastal states in managing and protecting ocean resources and
those of maritime user states in ensuring high-seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight, including for military purposes. Thus while in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone the coastal state was granted sovereign rights to resources and juris-
diction to make laws related to those resources, high-seas freedoms of
navigation were specifically preserved for all states, to ensure the participation
of maritime powers in the convention.
Nonetheless, China has persistently attempted to shift this carefully balanced
compromise by making more expansive claims of legal protection for its security
interests, especially in the South China Sea. For instance, one statement by a Chi-
nese military spokesman concerning international freedoms of navigation in
the South China Sea is typical. A Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman, Senior
Colonel Geng Yansheng, stated, “We will, in accordance with the demands of in-
ternational law, respect the freedom of passage of ships or aircraft from relevant
countries which are in compliance with international law.”43 When pressed to
explain the distinction between “passage” and “navigation,” other senior Chinese
officials have stated that the Chinese government has not objected to the passing
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of U.S. Navy vessels through the Chinese EEZ en route to another destination.
However, when such vessels conduct exercises, gather intelligence or other mili-
tarily useful data, or undertake activities other than mere passage, these officials
argue, they are in violation of international and Chinese domestic law.44
Secretary Clinton, however, made clear at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July
2010 that in the South China Sea the United States will not accept China’s limita-
tions on freedoms of navigation for military purposes. She stated that the
United States, like all nations, has “a national interest in freedom of navigation,
open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in
the South China Sea.”45
THREE OBJECTIVES
China is pursuing three main objectives in the South China Sea and Southeast
Asia: regional integration, resource control, and enhanced security. Chinese ac-
tions over the past four decades are better understood in relation to its various
strategies for achieving these objectives.
Regional Integration
Regional integration between China and the states of Southeast Asia is a priority
for China, as part of its overall policy of “Peaceful Rise.”46 Regional integration
with other South China Sea states, therefore, has both political and economic as-
pects. To achieve growth, it is helpful for a state to have peaceful borders so that
resources can be channeled into economic development rather than armies and
border defense systems.47 Accordingly, in order to focus domestic energy on its
rapid economic rise, China entered into a period of “strategic pause” with re-
spect to physical confrontation over the Spratly Islands beginning in the
mid-1990s and after the political setbacks China suffered in connection with the
Mischief Reef incident. This new strategy, pursued from the late 1990s until at
least 2007, resulted in major progress, in that opportunities for regional political
and economic integration with China were largely welcomed by Southeast Asian
states as promoting region-wide economic growth and counterbalancing other
outside powers, such as the United States.
In order to facilitate the political aspects of regional integration, China un-
dertook numerous political relationships with ASEAN. Perhaps the most suc-
cessful aspects of China’s pursuit of regional integration, however, were the
programs of economic, commercial, and infrastructural development. Two-way
trade, for instance, soared from less than eight billion dollars in 1991 to $106 bil-
lion in 2004 and to $231 billion in 2008. The last figure is higher than the trade
between ASEAN states and the United States for the same year, which amounted
to $172 billion. For many years, ASEAN enjoyed a trade surplus with China; that
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has slipped in recent years, and to compensate, China has agreed to increase its
bilateral investment in the region by 60 percent over two years.
Additionally, China has supported major infrastructure projects in the re-
gion. One such project, the Nanning–Singapore economic corridor, focuses on
the construction of an integrated railway transportation system that links
Nanning, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and
Singapore. A second project, the Greater Mekong Subregion, similarly links
Kunming, in China’s Yunnan Province, with Singapore via high-speed rail. More
difficult for China to achieve are Pan Beibu Gulf development and the Hainan
Initiative. These programs face the obvious challenge of dealing with areas in
which sovereignty and jurisdiction remain in dispute.
Some commentators suggest that China’s many initiatives in support of re-
gional integration reflect a “ripe fruit” strategy in which time is on China’s side.
According to this line of thinking, regional integration efforts were designed to
freeze the disputes and create favorable regional political conditions while
China increased its economic and military power. In this view, once a high level
of comparative development is achieved, “if . . . [China] continues to press its ex-
pansive claims in the South China Sea aggressively, the islands and their atten-
dant maritime space may simply fall into its hands like ripe fruit. At the least,
[China] will dominate the issue and obtain the lion’s share of any settlement.”48
Some Chinese believe that the aims of China’s substantial investment in
Southeast Asia and of its policy of freezing disputes were to earn gratitude, or
perhaps leverage, that would result in willing abandonment, in China’s favor, of
South China Sea claims by other states. Recent events, however, suggest that
Southeast Asian states prefer that no major power, including China, gain too
much influence in the region. Thus, in a pendulum swing opposite to the one in
the 1990s that led ASEAN states to welcome greater Chinese regional involve-
ment, Southeast Asian states now invite the attention of outside powers, includ-
ing the United States, to offset China’s present rising regional influence, in part
to ensure that negotiations over South China Sea disputes proceed on a
reasonably equal footing.
Resource Control
In addition to regional integration, China is also pursuing the objective of en-
hancing its long-term resource security by ensuring its control over most of the
South China Sea’s living and nonliving resources.49 As one Chinese commenta-
tor stated, “What is the major challenge now confronting our nation? It is the
question of resources.”50 Zhou Shouwei, vice president of the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation, has stated, “Offshore and especially deep-water oil
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and gas discoveries have great significance for replenishing China’s and the
world’s oil resources.”51
Fishing resources are also important to the Chinese leadership. One govern-
ment publication states, “The . . . Sino-Vietnamese Northern Gulf Fishing
Agreement has dramatically compressed the working space for our nation’s fish-
ermen. These new difficulties for our hard-pressed fleets undoubtedly consti-
tute one disaster after another. Not only have [such agreements] worsened the
situation, but there is also the possibility that it could touch off social instability
in various coastal towns and villages.”52 Indeed, the Chinese navy sees the im-
portance of sea power as an aspect of this resource security.
In the new century, the oceans are . . . strategic treasure troves of natural resources
for the sustainable development of humankind. Humankind’s full exploitation and
utilization of the oceans and joint management of the oceans in keeping with the law
is essentially a redistribution of the world’s maritime rights and interests. Whoever
has the greatest investment in the oceans, whoever has the greatest capacity for ex-
ploiting the oceans, and whoever controls the oceans will have the upper hand and
will acquire more wealth from the oceans, and that nation will be rich and powerful.
Therefore it is inevitable that the oceans will become an important arena for interna-
tional political, economic, and military struggles as well as an important objective in
the struggle of every nation for rights and interests.53
Perhaps this unidentified author’s primary intention was to justify expansion
of China’s navy. However, that he chose to do so using arguments about resource
insecurity and the importance of national control over maritime resources is an
indication of anxiety among the Chinese people and leadership over the pros-
pect of providing food and energy for more than 1.3 billion people, especially as
expectations rise along with China’s economic status. Thus, an important objec-
tive for China is to ensure its future access to the resources of the South China
Sea.
Enhanced Security
China’s third objective appears to be to enhance its control over the South China
Sea in order to create a maritime security buffer zone that protects the major
population centers, industry, and rich cultural sites of China’s developed eastern
coastal area.
As a retired PLA major general has stated,
China’s sea area is the initial strategic barrier for homeland security. The coastal area
was the front line of growth during China’s economic development and the develop-
ment of Chinese civil society. China’s most developed regions are along the coastline.
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. . . The coastal area also possesses the largest population of any of the country’s re-
gions, the highest concentration of high-technology industries, and the most mod-
ernized culture. If coastal defense were to fall into danger, China’s politically and
economically important central regions would be exposed to external threats. In the
context of modern warfare, military skills such as long-range precision strike develop
gradually, which makes the coastal sea area more and more meaningful for homeland
defense as a region providing strategic depth and precious early-warning time. In
short, the coastal area is the gateway for China’s entire national security.54
The idea that China needs to control its littoral maritime zones is based on the
classic approach to geostrategy of a country having security concerns with re-
gard to both land and sea. Such countries generally follow security strategies
that balance land and maritime strength in order to develop concentric circles of
strategic control, influence, and reach around their central regions of vital na-
tional interest.55 Thus, the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea col-
lectively represent an area in which Chinese strategists believe they need to
develop military control in order to exclude external threats and thereby to raise
the level of security of China’s coastal region.56
However, China’s recent actions to enhance its security by competing with
other claimants for sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control over the South China
Sea fail to account for the interests of other states. Thus, beginning in March
2009, when China shifted its regional strategy away from integration and re-
source cooperation toward competition over sovereignty and security, it allowed
the “ripened fruit,” the political benefits, gained by more than a decade of coop-
eration to rot on the vine unharvested. Chinese policy makers would do well to
remember that regional integration, resource control, and enhanced security are
the shared objectives of all regional states and that in the past cooperation has
produced substantial results that the recent turn to competition is unlikely to
duplicate. Win-win solutions that focus on mutual interests are more promising
than win-lose solutions based on competition for sovereignty, jurisdiction, and
control.
NEW THINKING ABOUT AN OLD PROBLEM
It is striking how much the South China Sea interests of China and its Southeast
Asian neighbors overlap. Regional political and economic integration has
greatly benefited each of them. Each has an interest in sustainable development
of the South China Sea’s rich fisheries and other living resources. Each has a
growing economy and a similarly growing demand for hydrocarbons to support
it. The national security of each depends in part on the security of the waters off
its shores. What is also striking, however, is that one of the primary reasons for
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the failure to resolve the disputes is that the chosen mechanisms for resolution
are all win-lose—that is, exclusive state sovereignty and jurisdiction allow for
only one winner and create many losers.
Because the islands and reefs of the South China Sea were for many centuries
open to fishermen and traders of all coastal peoples—Vietnamese, Chinese, Ma-
lay, and Filipinos alike—each nation developed a connection to and an interest
in these islands. Similarly, for many centuries the rich fishing grounds were open
to all without fear of exclusion or dominance by others. The present competition
for exclusive sovereignty over the islands and for jurisdiction over the resources is
shortsighted and self-referential, and it fails to account for the mutuality of the in-
terests at stake. This type of conflict resolution, in fact, fails to resolve anything
—losers of one round become incentivized to begin a new campaign to reverse or
compensate for their loss. In Asia, where memories are long, a win-lose dynamic
would essentially institutionalize tensions rather than reducing them permanently.
Some in China seem to recognize this reality. One Chinese commentator has
observed that “as China’s comprehensive national strength has increased along
with its military capabilities and its requirements for energy resources, so
ASEAN states’ anxiety about a China threat has been increasing by the day since
independently they have no prospect to balance against China. . . . [Thus, they
have taken steps to] unite together in order to cope with China.”57 Because it
helps overcome the perception that growing Chinese strength is a danger to its
neighbors’ interests, this author praises the benefits of joint development. Oth-
ers are less sanguine. As one military scholar put it, “China’s policy toward the
South China Sea is ‘sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, pursue joint develop-
ment.’ But ‘setting aside disputes’ does not mean setting aside our sovereignty. . . .
China is already not a weak country. . . . [I]t is hoped that related countries will
not make a strategic miscalculation.”58
Although in China there is a rich and varied debate about how best to pursue
the nation’s interests in the South China Sea, there is a common center to the
range of Chinese perspectives.59 All reflect dissatisfaction with the status quo, in
which the Chinese perceive that only China is exercising restraint while all other
claimants actively develop and exploit the resources in the disputed zones. There
is also general recognition that China has few good options for protecting its in-
terests. Finally, there is general agreement that militarization would only aggra-
vate the disputes and that improving and energizing China’s civilian enforcement
capabilities can best protect Chinese interests.
Thus, there is a kernel of hope that solutions to the Three Disputes can be
found in win-win, interest-based approaches that accommodate all and exclude
none.60 A good place to begin would be meaningful implementation of the
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principles of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
which emphasize peaceful approaches to the many disputes that currently dis-
turb regional tranquility.61
Win-Win Thinking about Sovereignty Disputes
China’s muscular insistence in the years between 1975 and 1995 on severing the
sovereignty interests of other countries in the Paracel and Spratly Islands re-
sulted only in a coalescence of political and military opinion in Southeast Asian
states against China. Even China’s policies of the past fifteen years of gaining po-
litical and economic rather than military leverage have failed, because they re-
mained focused on obtaining exclusive Chinese domination of territories that
China has never in its history fully controlled and in which all other peoples in
the region were traditionally able to operate. The policy failed because it would
have thwarted the interests of other states in the region to use the physical terri-
tory of the Spratly Islands to pursue commercial interests, research, enhanced
regional and national security, and recreation. This situation suggests that past
proposals for shared regional “ownership” of the islands should be revived.
One such proposal, originally made by Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and
Noel Ludwig, was to establish a form of “regional sovereignty” over the islands
themselves—that is to say, shared authority over the islands among regional
states, to the exclusion of all others.62 A regional authority established by agree-
ment among the claimants could exercise this authority over the islands, their
territorial seas, and sovereign airspace. Representation in the regional authority
could take many forms but would be based on a combination of such factors as
national population, length of coastline, and extent of current and historical usage
—all of which are recognized in international case law as legitimate bases for re-
solving maritime disputes. This arrangement would allow all regional claimant-
states to pursue their interests in the physical territory in the South China Sea
through a political mechanism designed to manage the territory efficiently and
effectively on behalf of them all.
A second approach that bears consideration is represented by Svalbard, be-
tween the north coast of Norway and Greenland. In order to resolve Svalbard’s
indeterminate status and to avoid international conflict over its resources, con-
cerned states attending the Paris Conference in the aftermath of World War I ne-
gotiated the Treaty of Spitsbergen of 9 February 1920. The treaty gave primary
sovereignty to Norway but allowed resource-related rights to all signatories.
Original signatories included Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
Soviet Union signed in 1924 and Germany in 1925; currently there are more
than forty signatories, including China.63 When the treaty came into force on 14
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August 1925, Norway took over sovereignty, subject to rights of all parties to fish
and hunt, to enjoy “equal liberty of access and entry for any reason, [and] to
carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and com-
mercial operations on a footing of absolute equality.”64 This creative approach to
sovereignty, which accommodated the mutual interests of the various parties
with the support of the international community, has contributed to regional
security by avoiding conflict and effectively managing living and nonliving re-
sources, and it has productively contributed to international scientific research.
As such, it should be considered a potential model for a negotiated resolution of
the disputes over the Spratly Islands.
Win-Win Thinking about Jurisdiction Disputes
There are many examples of collaborative regimes to share jurisdiction over
maritime resources that could be effectively applied in the South China Sea, in-
cluding several in East and Southeast Asia. The joint Chinese-Vietnamese fish-
ing zone in the Gulf of Tonkin/Beibu Gulf is one example of an approach to
overlapping jurisdictional rights and accommodation of mutual, long-standing
interests.65 Useful elements of this agreement include delimited zones of na-
tional jurisdiction, a cooperative-management zone of mutual jurisdiction, and
an agreement to cooperative management.66
Specifically, the agreement establishes a Joint Fishery Committee (JFC) that
includes representatives from each party. Together they manage common func-
tions, such as fisheries research, consultation with members of the fishing in-
dustry, and recommendations concerning catch quotas for the different types of
species. The JFC is quite powerful, in that it has authority to take binding con-
servation and management measures in order to ensure that fish stocks do not
become endangered through overfishing. Decisions are made on the basis of
consensus, which promotes willing compliance among state parties. At annual
meetings the JFC employs a “quantity-control approach” that sets a “total allow-
able catch” per species for each of several target species and specifies the number
of vessels that may fish them. The total allowable catch is based on the status of
each species, the extent of traditional fishing activity, and the impact of modern
fishing and management techniques.67
A multilateral entity that could potentially serve as a model for the South China
Sea is the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). NAFO manages the
high-seas fisheries in a rich fishing ground outside any EEZ in the northwestern
Atlantic Ocean. NAFO’s “objective is to contribute through consultation and co-
operation to the optimum utilization, rational management and conservation of
the fishery resources of the Convention Area.”68 The convention establishes a Fish-
eries Commission whose purpose is to achieve “optimum utilization of the fishery
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resources”and to adopt a total annual catch quota based on the recommendations
of a Scientific Council. The total annual catch quota, by species, is allocated by
the commission among the members, giving special consideration to traditional
fishing patterns and coastal communities whose livelihoods are based on re-
sources from fishing regional waters.
The commission is also responsible for the adoption of “international meth-
ods of control and enforcement” by which member states may engage in mutual
enforcement of quotas.69 Mutual-enforcement measures include a mandatory
vessel-monitoring system that uses satellite tracking to provide position updates
every two hours; a mandatory observer program in which every vessel fishing in
the regulatory area must carry an independent and impartial observer to report
any infringements; and a joint inspection and surveillance scheme in which con-
tracting parties have, in rotation, “inspection presence” responsibilities (cur-
rently Canada and the European Union) to monitor compliance by the vessels of
all contracting parties and report apparent infringements of any vessel to its
government for investigation and administrative or judicial action.70 NAFO’s
well developed scheme for multilateral accommodation of mutual fisheries
interests and enforceability shows promise for fisheries cooperation in the South
China Sea.
Win-Win Thinking about Disputes Related to Military Activities
There is at least some geostrategic rationale for Chinese antiaccess-oriented
norms. China seeks to develop control over its near seas in order to enhance its
own security and enjoy a freer hand in Asia to pursue its political objectives.
However, China’s approach to the normative relationship between coastal states
and foreign military power in the EEZ is shortsighted in that it focuses on
China’s regional objectives, seemingly without regard to the importance of na-
val power to the security of sea-lanes around the globe. China relies for its eco-
nomic growth and development on those very sea-lanes. Thus there appears to
be a gap between China’s expression of antiaccess legal norms and its own global
interests, since the logical result of a normative shift from international access to
the EEZ toward coastal-state authority to exclude foreign military power would
be an expanded zone of instability at sea and increased sanctuary for such
destabilizing elements as piracy, human trafficking, and illegal weapons and
narcotics trafficking.
It is Chinese pressure on the norms that govern military activities at sea that is
now drawing the United States into disputes in the South China Sea in the first
place. The United States has long withheld any opinion as to the ultimate dispo-
sition of questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction in the region. But freedom of
navigation and the freedom to pursue traditionally lawful military activities at
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sea are critical interests of the United States. Thus, at the 2010 ASEAN Regional
Forum in Hanoi, the United States and ASEAN nations made it clear to China
that its excessive claims in this regard are politically and legally unsustainable.
Secretary Clinton took the opportunity to remind ARF attendees that freedom
of navigation for all purposes, including for military activities, is a vital Ameri-
can national interest and is in the interest of all states that rely on open and
secure sea-lanes—and indeed, “all” includes China.
During the tense ARF session in Hanoi, published reports pointed to another
by-product of China’s policies—a desire, born of rising friction over South
China Sea security issues, by many regional states for renewed American atten-
tion to regional security dynamics. As one Australian defense scholar stated, “All
across the board, China is seeing the atmospherics change tremendously. . . . The
idea of the China threat, thanks to its own efforts, is being revived.”71 Unfortu-
nately, the Chinese policy-making community currently seems unwilling or un-
able to accommodate the interests of either its regional neighbors or the United
States, despite China’s pledge in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea to “respect . . . freedom of navigation in and overflight above
the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”
This intractability reflects a national self-assertion that has only reaped instabil-
ity. More traditional Chinese cultural thinking reflects elements of self-restraint
and responsibility for others, especially those who are weaker, elements that
appear to have been suppressed from the Chinese political body as present
policies were made in 2009 and 2010.
Underlying the concern of other states about China’s behavior and interna-
tional law perspectives is the question of what kind of major power China will
become as it continues to rise. Will it use its increased power to achieve only its
own interests, at the expense of the important interests of others? If so, this is a
win-lose path that is likely to lead to continued tensions and possibly even con-
flict. Or will China undertake a more active leadership role from within the cur-
rent architecture of norms, institutions, and international law and seek to develop
win-win solutions to problems of overlapping interests? Whether the end of the
twenty-first century sees a strong United States or a strong China, or a strong
United States and a strong China, a regional partnership to address nontradi-
tional security concerns will have been a win-win approach, accommodating the
dynamics of mutual interests among the inevitable tensions of international
relations.
{LINE-SPACE}
The Three Disputes in the South China Sea have been sources of instability and
even aggression for more than four decades. Only after the negative reaction to
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the 1995 Mischief Reef incident and China’s shift of policy toward regional inte-
gration and joint resource development was there a period of relative peace. Fu-
ture peace and security in the South China Sea require all regional countries to
remain focused on mutual interests rather than on the pursuit of national inter-
ests alone. This mutuality should include a renewed commitment to political,
economic, and commercial integration and joint development of living and non-
living maritime resources, which form a common Asian heritage. Nonregional
states with regional interests, including the United States, can provide meaningful
assistance and support in these endeavors.
Achieving a lasting situation of regional stability will require new ap-
proaches. The current pursuits of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control are by
nature win-lose. Power alone may produce settlements, but such settlements
may not be final, because they do not account for the long-standing mutual in-
terests of others. New, win-win forms of problem solving are needed today
—forms marked by shared rather than exclusive authority and mutual rather
than nationalistic interests. Only such approaches will ensure that the
twenty-first century does not mirror the rivalry and conflict that dominated the
twentieth.
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